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abstract
This essay explores the intersection between Evangelicalism and foreign policy in the con-
text of the Vietnam War. As a handle into the topic, it focuses on examining how Billy Gra-
ham, a prominent religious actor, negotiated the public sphere and private halls of power in 
order to influence politics, and specifically the American foreign policy decision to inter-
vene in Vietnam. More than just a religious figure, Graham was a political actor who was 
able to adapt to a changing political climate by shrewdly turning to an apolitical message in 
the public sphere in order to sustain his political role in the private sphere. Within the White 
House, Graham practiced a unique and masterfully subtle style of ‘friendship politics.’ He 
cultivated a level of intimacy with President Johnson and Nixon unmatched by any other re-
ligious leader at that time and often leveraged this connection to influence foreign policy. By 
examining the political maneuvers of a man at the forefront of Evangelical Christianity, this 
paper aims to shed light on how a religious group sought to find, and found, its way into the 
White House, a platform that was used to nudge diplomatic decisions towards the Calvary.
the peter tomassi essay
Once described as “the closest thing to a White House Chaplain,” prominent American Evangelical 
Preacher William F. (Billy) Graham shared personal 
connections with every American president from 
Harry Truman to Barack Obama. Relations between 
Preacher and president were particularly warm over 
the course of the Vietnam War during the Johnson 
and Nixon era, as suggested by frequent letters 
of correspondence, telephone conversations, and 
overnight White House visits. These exchanges often 
detailed Graham’s advice and personal support for 
the president as well as his policy decisions. 
On July 11, 1964, Graham wrote a private letter 
to President Lyndon B. Johnson in which he voiced 
his support for U.S. escalation of the war against 
communism in Vietnam by painting the president as 
a Christ-like figure who was to save Christendom:
“My dear Mr President, 
… I do not know whether you have seen some of 
the newspaper articles where I have been quoted 
as supporting you and telling the people what 
a dedicated man you are. You are now getting 
some unjust criticism, but remember that the 
most criticized men in American history were 
those whose names shine brightest in history…
also remember they crucified Christ within 
three years after He began his public ministry. 
It is what God thinks about our actions and 
what history will say a 100 years from now that 
counts…the Communists are moving fast toward 
their goal of world revolution. Perhaps God 
brought you to the stop the Kingdom for such 
an hour as this – to stop them. In doing so, you 
could be the man that helped saved Christian 
civilization.”1
Yet, only four days earlier, when Graham was 
asked in public to comment on the morality of the 
Vietnam War at a press conference in Ohio, he 
portrayed himself as firmly apolitical: 
What do I think of Viet Nam I think I am as 
confused as most of the rest of us are but in 
studying these things we must realize that very 
few of us really know all the facts…And I think it 
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is very easy for some of us on the outside to give 
simple answers to complex problems, and it’s not 
quite as easy.2
Why did Graham maintain an apolitical front 
in public while playing a political role in encouraging 
the war in Vietnam in his private interaction with 
the president? Moreover, such a neutral public stance 
on Vietnam in the 1960s lay in stark contrast to his 
openly anti-communist, pro-intervention message 
during the Korean War in the 1950s. Graham had 
then publicly labeled the communists as “disciples of 
Lucifer [that have] slaughtered millions of innocent 
persons” and argued that American military strength 
was necessary for world peace.3 What caused this 
shift from political to apolitical in the public sphere?
This paper examines how Graham, a religious 
actor, negotiated the public and private halls of power 
in order to influence politics, and specifically, the 
American foreign policy decision to intervene in 
Vietnam. More than just a religious figure, Graham 
was a political actor who shrewdly turned to an 
apolitical message in public in order to sustain his 
political role in the private realm. The 1950s was 
characterized by an atmosphere of public religiosity, 
which allowed Graham, a rising Evangelical figure, to 
speak openly on political issues with little criticism. 
Moreover, this decade also mapped onto strident 
McCarthyism, providing a larger rhetorical space for 
Graham’s overheated political message. In contrast, 
the 1960s saw America’s post-war religious fervor 
become more subdued, and loud McCarthyite anti-
communism similarly quieted down. The zeitgeist of 
the sixties was marked by increased secularization 
and war weariness. On the issue of U.S. intervention 
overseas, a single anti-communist, pro-war stance 
no longer dominated public opinion. In its place 
was a range of divisive and divergent opinions. This 
change in societal climate saw Graham moving along 
with the times, as he simultaneously shifted from 
vocal anti-communism to a public neutral stance 
that maintained a focus on converting individuals to 
Christianity. In keeping above the fray, the Preacher 
(Graham) avoided being perceived as violating the 
separation of church and state whilst sustaining his 
popularity and authority among an increasingly 
cynical American public. Navigating his public and 
private platforms of power, the Preacher consciously 
retreated from openly airing his support for war so 
that he might privately encourage the presidents 
towards intervention, an action he believed to be 
more efficacious. 
How Graham negotiated his political role 
illuminates a moment in time when a religious 
group attempted to assert itself on diplomatic 
decisions. Though the subject of this study may 
be Billy Graham, he is not to be seen as merely 
an individual actor, but rather a conduit by which 
organized Evangelicalism courted political influence. 
He is representative of the movement for three main 
reasons. First, Graham’s pro-war stance was not an 
independent view, but one rooted in biblical theology 
advocated by the greater Evangelical community. 
Second, Graham was not working alone, but had the 
backing and support of the Billy Graham Evangelistic 
Association (BGEA), formed in 1950 to support the 
evangelist’s crusade planning. Third, Billy Graham 
was considered a prominent leader of Evangelicalism 
in America, if not the face of the movement. A New 
York Times article once proposed, “If Evangelicals 
wanted to know where the movement was at any 
moment, the only sure guide was to look to where 
Graham is.” 4 Hence, to gain an insight into how 
Evangelicals attempted to shape foreign policy in 
Vietnam, it seems an appropriate choice to examine 
Graham and his political strategies.  
Conventional accounts of US diplomatic 
history focus mainly on realist assumptions and 
offer balance-of-power, geo-strategic and economic 
explanations for intervention overseas. However, 
there has been a recent pushback in scholarship 
suggesting that such traditional interpretations 
cannot fully account for why America went to war. 
The presumed separation between church and state 
has led many scholars to dismiss that religion has 
a role to play in U.S. politics, let alone geopolitics. 
However, this essay proposes that its role in shaping 
statecraft is one that is worth exploring. Specifically, 
by examining the political maneuvers of a man at the 
forefront of Evangelical Christianity, this paper aims 
to shed light on how a religious group found its way 
into the White House. 
Current scholarship on Billy Graham is largely 
journalistic or biographical in nature, focusing on 
his impact on the Evangelical movement and social 
ethics, but is less interested in his relationship to 
political power.5 Scholars during the Nixon era treat 
Graham as a spokesman for the ‘silent majority’ and 
an advocate for civil religion. A recent work by Steven 
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Miller examines Graham’s presumed constituency 
in the South and argues that southern politicians 
and people alike had looked to him for regional 
leadership on matters of desegregation and civil 
rights.6 Yet, Graham’s influence on policy seemed to 
have extended beyond national boundaries. More 
than just a phenomenon situated within the context 
of Cold War religiosity or the origins of American 
Evangelicalism, Graham was a shrewd political actor 
who moved with the times.
This essay is organized around three broad 
strokes of argument: political context, political style, 
and political complexity. The first section situates 
Graham in the historical and political context of a 
larger Evangelical movement. The second section 
focuses on Graham’s political style, examining 
the shifting public and private dimensions of the 
Preacher’s political and moral interventions. The 
final section of the essay aims to give nuance to the 
argument by highlighting the broader tensions and 
complexities of the nexus of religion and political 
power as they emerge in this case. 
NEO-EVANGELICALISM: THE FIGHT TO RETURN 
TO THE FRONTLINES
Following the end of the Second World War, 
America witnessed an upsurge in public religiosity. 
This was the fruit of a concerted and organized 
campaign by the Evangelical Movement, a religious 
group that had long desired to reclaim its place of 
prominence and to influence national policy in a 
country which they deemed to be God’s chosen 
nation. Leading this Evangelical fight to return to 
the frontlines of society was Billy Graham, a talented 
Preacher whose charming personality allured both 
people and politicians alike. 
Working for the Youth for Christ, Graham, 
then just a thirty-one-year-old rookie evangelist, 
was scheduled to lead the ‘Christ for Greater Los 
Angeles’ Campaign in September 1949. Yet, it was 
this particular event that catapulted the captivating 
Preacher into overnight national prominence. 
Applying biblical prophecy to the contemporary 
world, Graham cried with a trumpet loud voice:
Western culture and its fruits had its foundation 
in the word of God…Communism, on the other 
hand, has decided against God, against Christ, 
against the Bible, and against all religion…
Communism is a religion that is inspired, 
directed and motivated by the Devil himself 
who has declared war against Almighty God…
The Fifth columnists, called Communists, are 
more rampant in Los Angeles than any other 
city in America…In this moment I can see the 
judgment hand of God over Los Angeles, I can 
see judgment about to fall.7
Because of the reported conversion of 
several famous Hollywood personalities, the 
campaign caught the attention of national and even 
international media.8 An advertisement in the Los 
Angeles Daily News on October 26, 1949 printed 
a picture of a young Preacher charismatically 
stabbing his finger at the sky with Bible in hand and 
proclaimed 5,000 conversions after “Billy Graham’s 
5th Sin-Smashing Week.” 
Following the end of the World War, Neo-
Evangelical hope for an American religious revival 
seemed indeed to be well on its way—national 
religious membership surpassed 50 percent of 
the total population by 1945. Quickly noting the 
striking convergence between the national public 
mood and Evangelical concerns and aspirations, the 
Neo-Evangelicals seized the opportunity to reinsert 
themselves into public life. In the uncertain age 
of atheistic communist conquest and threats of a 
nuclear holocaust, the Neo-Evangelicals assured the 
American people that they could find their security 
and hope in their Evangelical heritage. ‘Spiritual 
Armageddon [was] Here” and America’s weapon was 
‘the saving Star of Bethlehem.”9
Fully aware that the socio-political trend was 
in their favor, the Neo-Evangelicals then mounted a 
massive, vibrantly innovative, and creative campaign 
to regain public presence and bring renewal to 
America. Most striking of all their efforts were the 
citywide revival meetings, reminiscent of the tent 
meetings of the First Great Awakening. On Memorial 
Day of 1945, Youth for Christ, a rising para-church 
group, organized a Chicagoland Gospel Rally at the 
Soldier Field Stadium, which attracted nearly 70,000 
people. These rallies “dress[ed] revivalism in more 
fashionable attire,” as Preachers copied popular 
entertainment styles, updated gospel music, and 
produced slick advertisements.10
This brings us back to September 1949 at the 
Youth for Christ Los Angeles Gospel Rally. This 
revival meeting that skyrocketed Billy Graham to 
national fame was not a sudden anomaly but rather 
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a product of a momentum kick started by the Neo-
Evangelicals in the early 1940s. Billy Graham had 
come to matter in American public life and, by 
implication, so did the Evangelicals. Yet, this was only 
a foretaste of what was to come. 
THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF THE PRO-WAR 
EVANGELICAL MOVEMENT 
Monica Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah 
propose the concept of a “Political Theology,” defined 
as “the set of ideas that a religious community 
holds about political authority and justice.”11 These 
ideas are formulated based on religious texts and 
traditions, and represent how a religion’s theological 
beliefs and statutes are translated into political ideals 
and agendas.12 They contend that a religion’s political 
theology in some part influences a religious actor’s 
political activity and determines how he interacts 
with the state.13
The Evangelical movement’s doctrinal views on 
war led them to believe that war was natural, given 
that it was in man’s inherent evil human nature to 
fight and war with one another.14 True peace could 
not come until the second coming of Christ.15 
Regarding the Vietnam War, Evangelicals saw U.S. 
intervention as a necessary struggle during the 
Cold War between the godly and the godless, given 
communist antagonism towards God and religion. 
In a magazine editorial, the National Association of 
Evangelicals declared communists as “the enemies 
of the American way of life.”16 Quoting the Apostle 
Paul’s call to “stand fast in the freedoms wherewith 
Christ has made us free,” Decision Magazine, a 
household Evangelical periodical, ran an article 
that claimed that Christians should support the war 
because communism threatened the freedom of both 
South Vietnam and America. In their eyes, once the 
Vietcong won over Vietnam, at least a million South 
Vietnamese would immediately be executed because 
of their faith.17
Evangelicals also supported the war in Vietnam 
because of the fresh ground for missions to both 
the U.S. military and locals. The military draft and 
build up in the Vietnam War allowed for Evangelism 
to reach recruit thousands whose experience in the 
battlefield deepened their need and desire for God.18 
Additionally, the war in Vietnam also enhanced the 
opportunity for missionaries to reach the locals. The 
Asia-South Pacific Evangelism Congress in Singapore 
in November 1968 boldly announced the “Christ 
Seeks Asia” mission.19 In line with this vision, the 
war in Vietnam presented missionaries with hope for 
entry into a country that had previously been closed 
off to the gospel. 
Toft et al. argue that this very political theology 
shapes and influences the political pursuits and 
inclinations of a religious actor.20 Hence, through 
examining the actions and message of Billy Graham, 
the religious actor of the Evangelical movement, 
I will demonstrate how political theology may be 
directly translated into concrete political activity.
FROM POLITICAL TO APOLITICAL 
In an interview on June 29, 1979, George 
Champion, retired Chairman of the Board of 
Directors at the Chase Manhattan Bank and key 
patron of the 1969 New York Crusade, was asked 
whether Graham had “changed in twenty-two years, 
as far as his message concerned…[and had] he 
addressed social ills more or less than he did when 
he was here in 1957?” To this, Champion firmly 
answered, “He hasn’t changed that I can see…He’s 
preaching the Bible, and he’s referring to the Bible 
all the time.”21 Despite Champion’s claim, a closer 
examination comparing Graham’s public message in 
the 1950s to that of the 1960s reveals quite a different 
story. Specifically, the fifties saw Graham openly 
preaching a fiery, fist-shaking clarion-call to arms 
against communism, while in the sixties he carried a 
mellower message focusing on Jesus and the Gospel 
and little else. 
The headlines of a New York Times article on 
January 3, 1951 boldly read, “Graham says City is 
No. 1 Target.” The thirty-two year old evangelist 
had warned a gathering of 700 clergymen that New 
York City “stood on the brink of catastrophe” as a 
prime target for communist destruction.22 Like other 
Evangelicals, Graham firmly believed and openly 
preached that communism was the brainchild of the 
Devil, and a godless ideology that clearly opposed 
the doctrines of Christianity.23 In his eyes, the 
Soviet Union desired international conquest, and he 
feared that communism would take over the United 
States and the world either by open aggression or a 
fifth column within American society.24 Not only 
did he preach against communism, he also urged 
an open battle against it during his Crusades. In 
September 1957, to an audience of over 100,000 men 
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gathered at Broadway in New York, Graham called 
America to arms as he loudly proclaimed, “Let us 
tell the world tonight that we desperately want peace 
but not peace at any price…let us tell the world 
tonight that [America is] morally and spiritually 
strong, as well as militar[ily] and economically.” 25 
Following his visit to the troops in Korea in 1952, 
Billy Graham published and circulated a war diary 
titled I Saw your Sons at War in which he recorded 
his personal impressions of the war during his 
travels. The diary concluded with Graham’s remarks 
and recommendations on political situation of the 
country. Affirming President Syngman Rhee, he 
argued that although, in principle, the war should be 
fought by locals, in reality, the South Koreans could 
not hold out against the communist North on their 
own until their armies were properly trained and 
supplied. Hence, he urged the United States against 
an immediate withdrawal from Korea.26 
Moreover, Graham’s audience was not just the 
congregation at his crusades, but also the politicians 
in power as well. Upon hearing news reports of 
North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, 
Graham wrote a private telegram to President Harry 
Truman saying,
Millions of Christians praying God give you 
wisdom in this crisis. Strongly urge showdown 
with communism now. More Christians in 
Southern Korea per capita than any part of the 
world. We cannot let them down.27
Importantly, his private and public anti-
communist messages were one and the same 
throughout the 1950s. Graham was unafraid 
to openly urge the Oval Office to take up arms 
and defend the freedom of United States against 
communism. For example, in April 1950, against 
the backdrop that the USSR was growing a nuclear 
arsenal, the Preacher publicly called on the president 
to announce a day of national repentance.28 Similarly, 
following his emergence at the White House lobby 
after a meeting with Eisenhower in 1956, Graham 
was quoted by the New York Times saying, “Militant 
Christianity is the philosophical bulwark the free 
world needs to add to its economic superiority in the 
“Cold War” with international Communism.”29
 Having heard Graham’s fiery message 
encouraging and urging war against communist 
domination, one would be extremely surprised to 
witness the same man later say, “I’m sure God is not 
limited to one particular government, and that’s the 
reason I do not carry on a major Crusade against 
any particular ideology.”30 This was during a press 
conference in response to a question which asked 
him whether the Christian Church had “written the 
[communist] world off.”31 Yet, by the 1960s Graham’s 
public message had experienced a noticeable shift 
in both content and tone, changing from politically 
charged to gently apolitical. When asked to give the 
Christian perspective on the morality or justice of the 
Vietnam War, Graham appeared ambivalent, stating, 
“I don’t intend to answer political questions…I have 
not made any statement on Vietnam [because] I 
don’t know the answer.”32 When further pressed on 
the church’s moral obligation to provide an answer, 
Graham maintained that the church should not 
impose their authority on the state: 
I remember Mr Dulles one time used to go to 
church and he said, “Here I am the Secretary of 
State with all the facts. I go to church and am 
hungry for a sermon on the gospel, hungry to 
hear something about the Bible. And all I get is 
a lecture on what I ought to be doing in foreign 
affairs by a man who is not competent to talk on 
foreign affairs.33 
Such a response was vastly different from 
the Preacher’s earlier public recommendations 
to the public and the White House on matters of 
diplomacy. In his war diary on Korea, Graham had 
clearly implied that the Americans should continue 
to fight the war because it was a matter of achieving 
“moral justice” and not just peace.34 In stark contrast, 
Graham now publicly denied getting involved in 
the politics of the Vietnam War. He was apparently 
asked to join in on a Senate-initiated foreign relations 
committee to discuss his views on foreign policy, but 
the evangelist told of how he denied the invitation 
because he felt that he lacked the proper skills. 35
Instead, the evangelist repeatedly emphasized 
that his main message was apolitical and centered 
on faith and the gospel. In an interview with 
Edward Fiske of the New York Times, he told the 
journalist that he symbolized “faith that works” 
and nothing more. He even went to the extent of 
denying his widespread popularity or leadership of 
the Evangelical world. Instead, he saw himself as “an 
individual…and a private citizen.”36 With this, he 
painted an image of himself as a humble evangelist 
11
billy graham, evangelical religion, and the vietnam war
who dutifully sought to preach the gospel rather than 
get involved in politics or lead political lobbies. Each 
time he was asked to comment on the war, Graham 
would squarely maintain that his chief objective was 
to convert people to Christianity.37 
TURNING APOLITICAL TO STAY POLITICAL
Billy Graham’s motivations behind his apparent 
change in exterior posture from political in the 
1950s to apolitical a decade later seem somewhat 
unclear. One might suggest that perhaps Graham’s 
personal convictions on the threat of communism 
had changed over the course of time. Yet, private 
correspondence in the later period between him, 
the BGEA staff and American politicians confirm 
a resolutely anti-communist stand. In 1964, the 
Preacher warned President Johnson in a private letter 
of the perils of a global communist revolution. Much 
of this private rhetoric still recalled that of Graham’s 
public diatribes in the 1950s. Since it is clear that 
the Preacher’s private views on communism did 
not change over time, the apparent transformation 
in content and tone of his public message suggests 
that it was likely a more calculated move on his part. 
As the religious revival of the fifties faded away and 
Time Magazine proclaimed that ‘God [was] dead,’38 
it was unlikely that an Evangelical, even of Graham’s 
stature, could speak openly on political issues with 
authority without criticism. Hence, the Preacher 
rode the ebb and flow of American religious fervor, 
astutely turning to an apolitical message in the public 
in order to maintain his mass popularity and hence, 
sustain his political role in the private realm. In other 
words, Billy Graham turned apolitical in order to stay 
political. 
In the 1950s, a pervading sense of public 
religiosity continued to dominate and grow in 
society. Darren Dochuk argues that religion was 
the “third pillar of cold war culture,” and life in 
this decade revolved around “public displays of 
devotion.”39 Church membership rose from 49 
percent in 1940 to 69 percent in 1960, and in one 
year alone, the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, 
published first in 1952, sold more than 26.5 million 
copies. Hollywood saw the production of Christian 
‘epic’ stories like The Ten Commandments, Solomon 
and Sheba, and Ben Hur. Similarly, music charts 
saw the likes of Christian-themed singles find their 
way to the top ten. Religion not only permeated pop 
culture, but also the politics of the day.40 Under a 
law in 1952, the president inaugurated a National 
Day of Prayer. In 1956, Congress established “In God 
We Trust” as the official national motto. Andrew 
Preston argues that “as politics reflected religion, so 
too did diplomacy.”41 The country’s visible faith was 
seen as an antidote to the atheistic and godless evil 
of communism. Fletcher Bowron, the Mayor of Los 
Angeles in 1950, openly endorsed Christianity with 
a press release declaring that “the world face[d] a 
choice between God and atheistic communism” and 
therefore “never has the preaching of Christianity 
been so urgent and the acceptance of the Christian 
way of life so essential to [America’s] survival as free 
people in a free world.”42 Similarly, Graham’s early 
sermons were ingrained with the Cold War mentality 
as he tapped into people’s fear of communism and 
provided the Christian solution: a need to be a God-
fearing nation. Because of the widely accepted notion 
that America was ‘God’s country,’ the evangelist was 
able to openly speak on political issues with authority 
and little criticism. 
Furthermore, the atmosphere of public 
religiosity in the 1950s allowed, and even 
encouraged, an open relationship between a famous 
Evangelical figure such as Graham and politicians 
in power. Front-page editorials and headlines 
faithfully reported the “private” meetings between the 
president and Preacher. On 21 March 1956, a special 
report in the New York Times read, “The Reverend 
Billy Graham talked religion and world politics 
with President Eisenhower for 50 minutes today.”43 
Graham and Eisenhower were open with their 
personal relationship and news reports were happy 
to disclose that they were ‘old friends [that saw] 
each other quite frequently.’44 Each time Graham 
visited Eisenhower’s farm, shared a meal with him, 
or preached a sermon at the White House, journalists 
were eager to cover the meeting.45 More than just 
friends with a Preacher, Eisenhower fashioned 
himself as a religious man and overtly declared 
that belief in a supreme being was necessary to the 
American way of life.46 Overall, Graham was able to 
openly support White House foreign policy since the 
rhetoric of the politicians was very much in sync with 
the Evangelical anti-communist message. Because 
of the public religiosity of the fifties, this received 
neither open criticism nor calls for the separation 
between church and state. Instead, president and 
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Preacher formed a tight-knit bond as they together 
led the “chosen nation of God” together.
Yet, by the 1960s, the pervasive sense of 
religious fervor in America had begun to die down 
and had given way to a period of division and 
confusion amidst the rapid secularization of society. 
Michael Kazin and Maurice Isserman, two leading 
historians of the decade, claimed “nothing changed 
so profoundly in the United States during the 1960s 
as American religion.”47 They then addressed the 
trend of growing atheism in the country during that 
time. The religious confusion of the era is evident 
from how even Protestants began to subscribe to 
secular ideas about death and the meaning of life. 
In 1961, Christian theologian Gabriel Vahanian 
published “The Death of God,” in which he argued 
that the modern world and the scientific view of 
reality had superseded the need for a supernatural 
God.48 
The change in societal climate from the fifties 
to the sixties was reflected not only in the realm of 
religious fervor but also in the political mood of the 
day. The early fifties had mapped onto a strident anti-
communist message, beginning when Republican 
Senator Joseph McCarthy delivered a speech in 
which he claimed to have a list of names of 205 
communists working in the U.S. State Department. 
The media took this up, and McCarthy effectively 
galvanized the nation in a four-year campaign to rid 
the federal government and American institutions 
of its communist spies.49 McCarthyism provided 
Graham with an even larger rhetorical political space 
for his overheated message against communism. Yet, 
by the late fifties, similar to the subduing of religious 
fervor, loud McCarthyite anti-communism had also 
simmered down. 
Likewise, on the issue of U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam, a single anti-communist, pro-war stance 
no longer dominated public opinion as in the fifties. 
In its place were divisive and divergent opinions. 
Particularly, as the conflict in Vietnam escalated 
during the mid-sixties, the anti-war movement 
also started to grow. The American public that had 
once supported American intervention in WWII, 
and Korea now found the war in Vietnam morally 
reprehensible; given absence of a direct threat to 
American security, it felt that the bombing and 
devastation of Vietnam was unjustifiable.50 Because 
of the failure of expansion of the war to produce 
any tangible results, in addition to higher taxes 
required to fund the war and the continual expansion 
of the military draft, the public grew increasingly 
disenchanted and frustrated with Vietnam. Polls 
taken in 1967 indicated that the majority of 
Americans felt it was a mistake to intervene in 
Vietnam.51 Major metropolitan broadsheets shifted 
from support of the war to opposition, choosing to 
depict the war in unfavorable terms.52 Mounting 
dissatisfaction at the war drew large groups to 
anti-war rallies as participants became more vocal 
and daring in their opposition. One of the most 
striking act of protest took place on October 21, 
1967 when nearly 100,000 anti-war demonstrators 
gathered in Washington and another 35,000 raged 
at the Pentagon steps.53 In 1968, an anti-war student 
demonstration at Columbia University resulted in 
1,000 policemen wielding nightsticks to forcefully 
break up the mass sit-in.54 As time passed and the 
war still did not end, the anti-war movement grew in 
rancor and violence. George Herring argues that “the 
bloodshed in the streets of night-stick city” indicated 
that the war in Vietnam was causing “a kind of civil 
war” in the United States.55 The general public mood 
was tired, angry, frustrated, and confused. 
It is in light of this change in societal climate 
that we must understand Graham’s shift in public 
posture. The Preacher often prided himself on being 
keenly attuned to the socio-political and cultural 
trends of the day. In a letter to President Truman, 
Graham boasted that he knew “something of the 
mood, thinking and trends in American thought.”56 
The Preacher was a man who not only knew the 
times, but was also one who moved along with 
it. Parallel to the change in political and religious 
atmosphere, Graham simultaneously shifted from 
vocal anti-communism to a neutral apolitical stance 
that maintained a focus on converting individuals 
to Jesus Christ. The Preacher was aware that the 
war-weary public would have little patience for 
yet another loud and clamorous partisan voice. 
Moreover, an increasingly secularized and cynical 
society would not have gone easy on a Preacher with 
a political message, and likely would have criticized 
him for violating the separation of church and state. 
In choosing to keep above the fray by avoiding an 
overtly political message, Graham sought to sustain 
his popularity among the American public. 
Graham’s strategy of turning apolitical and 
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neutral on the war was wise, particularly when 
considered alongside the failure of vocal dove and 
hawk groups to gain mass appeal during this time. 
Herring argues that public opinion polls found that 
majority of Americans were disapproving of the 
anti-war movement, finding its “radical and hippie 
elements” extremely “obnoxious.”57 On the other end 
of the spectrum, the strident pro-war movement was 
not doing well either. One of its leading voices was 
the Fundamentalist movement, the hardline older 
brother of the Neo-Evangelical movement. The group 
was extremely vocal in reviling and rebuking both 
America and its leaders for its weak fight against 
communism. Carl McIntire, one of the movement’s 
key leaders, was loud and quick to condemn the 
president for his foreign policy decisions: 
You know who is dominating the world right 
now? The Russians…and the President of the 
United States is going around and around and 
around in circles on a secondary level…do you 
think for one minute that the President of the 
United States is going to do anything about 
Russia unloading additional tanks and carrying 
on all this wonderful, wonderful manifestation of 
peaceful coexistence with the United States? Do 
you think the President’s going to do anything 
about that? Of course not. Our hands are being 
tied by this miserable, abominable satanic 
philosophy of peacefully coexisting with evil and 
the works of the devil.58  
With such an antagonistic message, it is 
unsurprising that both American president and 
public turned away from the Fundamentalists. 
To grasp the significance of the failure of the 
hardliner Fundamentalist movement to the success 
Billy Graham and the Neo-Evangelicals, we must be 
reminded of the historical context surrounding the 
emergence of this new Evangelical coalition in the 
1940s. Following the demise of the Fundamentalism 
out of the public eye of America, a new and young 
generation of evangelists was eager to re-engage 
with American mainstream culture in order to start 
a revival in society. These Neo-Evangelicals were 
firm in their belief of the need to engage America, 
and denounced the “negativism” of the old school 
Fundamentalists that served only to attack and 
derogate rather than build up.59 Since the public 
religiosity of the fifties propelled both moderate and 
hardline movements, it was the “secular” sixties, the 
decade in which the socio-political climate of the 
day had turned against both groups, which proved to 
be the true test on which camp would be right in its 
approach. 
It was the Neo-Evangelical group that chose to 
engage and adapt that came out on top. Unlike their 
militant brother camp that was alienated by society 
and forced to withdraw back into the shadows, this 
new group of Evangelicals continued to remain a 
dominant force even amidst the secularization of 
society. They had learned from the mistakes of the 
1920s in which overtly political talk in a climate 
of modernization had led to the ousting of the 
Fundamentalists into the sidelines of American 
society. Carpenter argues that ever since this 
alienation, the Evangelicals had yearned for “respect 
in the public eye” and a “sympathetic hearing.”60 Now 
that the fifties had allowed them to win the attention 
from the media and the prominence in American life 
that they so craved, the neo-Evangelicals were hard-
pressed to protect and guard this newfound stature.
It is likely Graham’s shift from political to 
apolitical could also be explained and informed 
in part by this historical context surrounding 
Neo-Evangelicalism and its split from militant 
Fundamentalism. Graham was a part of, and even 
a leader of, the new and more accommodating 
generation of Evangelicals, and he too saw the need 
to adapt and change to societal currents. Learning 
from past mistakes, Graham cleverly chose to steer 
clear of explicitly divisive political issues such as 
support for the Vietnam War, in order to continue 
to attract the masses to listen to him. Unlike the 
Fundamentalist movement that had lost much of 
its clout because of its overtly political message, 
Graham’s Neo-Evangelical movement continued 
to amass popular support. A simple and apolitical 
message focusing on “an Unchanging Gospel for a 
Changing World” promised and provided stability in 
the midst of rapid social change and confusion. For 
example, a Connecticut investment banker explained 
that he went to Graham’s crusades because he saw 
him as “comforting”:
He’s talking about a part of America that doesn’t 
exist anymore…but it’s a part of America that 
people want to relate to…it’s nice to get away 
from all the problems of the cities and the 
universities for an hour and listen to someone 
who sees everything in such simple terms. 
Instead of smoking pot, you go hear Billy 
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Graham.61 
In a period when church membership was on 
the overall decline and Protestant Christianity was 
under attack by secularization, it is astounding that 
Graham’s popularity remained so high. His one-
week crusade in New York City in 1969 attracted 
approximately 234,000 attendants, an increase from 
a weekly average of 150,000 people during his four-
month tour of New York in 1957. Judging by these 
numbers, Evangelicalism continued to steadily 
grow and maintain its place in society even if public 
religiosity continued to wane.
One might conclude that an evangelist such 
as Graham would naturally do anything within 
his means to attract crowds to the gospel message. 
However, this was not the only reason that Graham 
needed to sustain a significant following; his 
motivations for the shift were not only spiritual but 
also political. He needed mass support to keep up 
his influence in the Oval Office and remain relevant 
in the eyes of those in power. After all, it was his 
mass popularity that first gave him inside access 
into the White House in the 1950s. When President 
Eisenhower held a news conference on foreign and 
domestic issues in 1956, a journalist asked him 
why he chose to spend so much time with Graham. 
Eisenhower replied, “Because of the very great 
crowds that he attracts to listen to him, I am very 
much interested in Billy Graham’s activities.”62 
Judging by the letters that Graham wrote to 
the White House, it is evident that the Preacher was 
well aware of the importance of mass popularity in 
getting the White House’s attention. In fact, when 
he first began to court a relationship with Harry 
Truman, America’s first postwar president, he often 
relied on his rising mass appeal to get access to him. 
In a letter to Truman in 1950, Graham carefully 
highlighted to the President that he spoke to “five 
to twenty thousand people a night in every section 
of America.”63 By the mid-1950s carrying onto the 
1960s, Graham attracted the masses in ways unheard 
of in modern American religious history. As he 
travelled across the country, hundreds of thousands 
of Americans came out to his crusades.64 Sources 
show that the Preacher continued to take the effort to 
notify the president of the success of his activities and 
public appearances in America and around the world. 
On June 30, 1967, he informed President Johnson, 
“You will be interested to know that we are averaging 
over 100,000 people a night here in Britain.”65 Again 
on June 1, 1968, “I address the Southern Baptist 
Convention on Friday night…at Houston and am 
planning to fly to New York where I am to appear 
on several television shows.”66 Through these letters, 
Graham subtly highlighted to the presidents the 
influence that he continued to hold among the people 
and, therefore, reminded them of his relevance to the 
White House. 
Graham likely made a conscious decision to 
shift the tone of his public message. For a man who 
clearly had strong views on communism and the 
war, and who possessed a large platform to voice 
these views, it must have taken much self-control to 
remain apolitical. Leon Jaworski, a prosecutor who 
was friend of both Johnson and Nixon, remarked that 
when it came to speaking on political issues, Graham 
“kept himself under tremendous…proper, adequate 
restraint.”67 The evangelist cautiously and watchfully 
nurtured and shaped his public image. In a letter 
written to The Christian Weekly in 1967 responding 
to criticisms that he had been meddling with national 
policy, Graham defended that he had been “extremely 
careful not to be drawn into…the problems of the 
Vietnam War.”68 Graham was also shrewdly aware of 
the distinction between the private and public. In a 
letter to President Johnson in 1964, he told him about 
how he wanted to “publicly answer Bishop Pike for 
his criticisms sweet little Lucy…but thought it might 
be better to let the matter die [though he] intend[ed] 
to write him a personal letter and send a copy to 
[Johnson].”69 Such a note reveals one who was 
keenly aware of the presence and impact of his public 
platform, but consciously chose not to use it, and yet 
at the same time, he did not forget to privately affirm 
the president of his support for him and his daughter.
Overall, Graham was able to skillfully negotiate 
the public and private spheres of power because he 
was highly cognizant of where he could best assert 
himself politically. While the societal climate of 
the 1950s opened space for him to vocally speak 
on political and religious issues without criticism 
or censure, the changing zeitgeist of the 1960s 
meant that his personal political views would be 
less welcomed by the public. As such, he turned 
his attention to the private halls of power at the 
White House. Yet to remain relevant in the private 
necessitated first remaining relevant in public. As a 
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keen political actor who followed societal currents 
of the time, Graham consciously retreated from 
airing his political views in public to maintain his 
mass following and, by extension, his influence in the 
private halls of power. What remains to be answered 
is what exactly Graham did or said in private in order 
to impact the direction of foreign policy in Vietnam.
POLITICKING IN THE PRIVATE: FRIENDSHIP 
POLITICS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
Graham once acknowledged in a press 
conference, “Sometimes you can do much more 
behind the scenes than you can waving out a flag.”70 
The Preacher’s popular mass following may have first 
gained him access into the White House, but it was 
really his strategic cultivation of intimate friendships 
with the presidents that allowed him to maintain and 
elevate his influence in the White House. Leveraging 
these friendships, Graham was able to have direct 
political conversations with decision makers, and he 
used this platform to voice support for the war.
In an oral history interview, Arthur Krim, 
an aide to President Johnson, described Billy 
Graham as a “President Gatherer” who “moved with 
ease to Nixon and then Ford and then Carter.”71 
However, there is evidence to show that Graham 
had established a relationship with the White House 
even before Johnson, starting with President Dwight 
Eisenhower in the 1950s. Graham wrote letters 
at least once a month to the president expressing 
his admiration and offering prayer and support. 
In a letter dated December 31, 1957, Graham told 
Eisenhower that he was “the most remarkable man 
in history…[and] God’s man of the hour.”72 In earlier 
letters, he also affirmed his “complete devotion and 
personal affection” to Eisenhower and told him 
that he had urged the 75,000 Americans present 
at his Crusade to bow their heads in prayer for the 
president.73 John Bolten, a companion to Graham 
in his travels to Asia during this time, noted how 
Graham would often drop by the Oval Office to see 
the president and discuss his observations of these 
places.74 The letters of correspondence between 
the Preacher and the White House confirm this—
Graham would often request to see the president 
to update him on the conversations he had with 
various international heads of states during his 
travels. Upon returning from the Middle East in 
March 1956, Graham asked to meet Eisenhower 
because he felt that he had “vital information” to 
share with him after his meeting with the heads of 
the Arab nations.75 Along with his public diatribes 
against communism, Graham also attempted to 
privately urge Eisenhower to fight against the spread 
of communist ideology. In 1954, amidst news 
of potential French military defeat in Vietnam, 
Graham wrote a letter to the president warning 
him, “Indochina must be held at any cost.”76 The 
Preacher then offered to make use of his influence on 
television and radio to “sell the American public” on 
the necessity of pushing back against communism in 
the Far East.77 
 After Eisenhower, Graham continued to 
foster what seemed to be even closer personal 
relationships with President Lyndon B. Johnson 
and Richard Nixon. With Eisenhower, a majority 
of the letters from the president were sent through 
his secretary or other White House aides. However, 
with Nixon and Johnson, words of affirmation and 
support were often directly exchanged between the 
presidents and the Preacher. Much of the public knew 
that Graham shared a close personal relationship 
with Nixon, one that began from the time Nixon ran 
for president against Kennedy in 1962. In his letters, 
Graham addressed the president by the informal 
nickname “Dick”. Records show that between 1962 
and 1972, the two would touch base on a nearly 
weekly basis over calls or meet-ups. Sometimes the 
two would even correspond more than once a day via 
telephone.78 In the telephone conversations between 
the two, there was a tone of ease and friendliness as 
their dialogues were often interrupted by chuckles 
and laughter at comments made.79 For example, in 
a twenty-minute conversation on February 21, 1973, 
the two casually chatted on a diverse range of topics 
stretching from Graham’s only aunt dying of cancer 
to commenting that “it was so stupid” of the Israelis 
to shoot down a Libyan airplane, and to pointing out 
how embarrassing it was for Israeli President Golda 
Meir to visit the U.S. at that time. They also enjoyed 
a private joke about Graham’s letter to Senator Mark 
Hatfield chiding him on his behavior towards the 
president.80 The clear camaraderie and comfort 
between the two men in their telephone exchanges is 
striking. The intimacy and rapport between them was 
also apparent from how Nixon broke down and cried 
on Graham’s shoulder after the he gave the eulogy at 
his mother’s funeral.81
16
columbia university journal of politics & society
While less known to the public eye, Graham 
also seemed to have shared an intimate relationship 
with President Johnson. In a letter dated November 
23, 1966, Graham wrote: 
I hope you realize that my personal affection 
for you has nothing to do with you being 
President….I just happen to love you- because 
you are you. Whether you are President Johnson 
or just plain Lyndon Johnson, I have the warmest 
affection for you as a personal friend.82
The affection seemed mutual—the president 
often invited Graham to spend time with him at the 
White House as an overnight guest. In a telephone 
conversation, Johnson told Graham that he desired 
him to visit for dinner and affirmed that the 
Preacher’s presence would make him feel “stronger” 
for the coming week.83 The relationship was intimate 
to the point where Graham would be invited to 
Johnson’s bedroom, where they would give each 
other massages.84 George Champion, another close 
friend of both Johnson and Graham, shared how 
Graham was often asked by the president to come to 
the White House and “morning, noon, and night…
he was there”.85 This is confirmed by the daily diaries 
of President Johnson, which reveal that Graham met 
or spoke with Johnson on a monthly and sometimes 
weekly basis. In addition to holding church services 
for the president, Graham would often meet with 
him over a meal, coffee, or sometimes even a movie 
at the mansion. Their wives, assistants, and even their 
children would often accompany the two. Records 
also show that Graham flew with Johnson to various 
events in his private presidential plane. On one 
occasion, President Johnson was recorded to have 
instructed his secretary to send flowers to Graham 
when he was ill and confined in the hospital.86 
 The frequency and closeness of the 
interactions between Preacher and presidents 
indicate that those in the Oval Office did not seek out 
the evangelist merely because of his influence among 
the masses, but potentially also because they shared 
personal relationships with him. Such friendships 
could not possibly be a result of simple coincidence, 
and there is evidence to suggest that Graham 
carefully nurtured and grew his relationship with 
the White House. This specific style of ‘friendship 
politics’ is first played out through Graham’s 
continual offering of spiritual support and prayers 
to the presidents. The language and rhetoric used in 
his letters to both Johnson and Nixon are strikingly 
similar. To Johnson, he would repeatedly tell him 
that his “thoughts and prayers are with [him] almost 
constantly” and that he would “ask God to give [him] 
strength, grace, courage and wisdom to carry the 
heaviest responsibility in the world.”87 In the same 
manner, Graham also told Nixon of how he had 
“a strange burden on [his] heart to pray for [him] 
almost constantly.”88 By offering his spiritual support 
to the presidents, Graham drew legitimacy from 
his status as a famous Preacher and wooed those in 
power by suggesting that their friendship with him 
would allow God to be on their side. For example, 
on the night before Johnson was due for a surgery, 
Graham went to the extent of telling the president 
that God had divinely woken him up in the middle 
of the night just to pray for his operation.89 In the 
same manner, he would assure Nixon that he strongly 
believed that the Lord was supporting him in all of 
his endeavors.90 
 In addition to acting as a spiritual advisor, 
Graham actively pursued friendship with the 
presidents by offering them his political support. 
Regardless of their political affinity, Graham never 
failed to assure his allegiance, suggesting that the 
nature of his support transcended partisan lines. 
Following a scandal during the 1964 presidential 
election campaign, where Graham’s daughter 
was reported to have expressed support for the 
Republican candidate Barry Goldwater, the Preacher 
was quick to assure Johnson that he had taken care 
of this by holding a press conference in which he 
explicitly rallied Americans to unite behind Johnson. 
He firmly added, “I want to do anything in this world 
to help you.”91 On a separate occasion in which a 
journalist took Graham’s comments and implied 
that he was criticizing one of Johnson’s decisions, the 
Preacher responded with a private letter to Johnson 
clarifying that this was taken out of context and 
maintained his support for the president.92 Billy 
Graham’s political support for President Nixon was 
even more evident and public. During both the 1962 
and 1969 presidential elections, Graham openly 
announced that he would vote for Nixon. In private, 
he would also sycophantically express his support 
with words such as “you’re the greatest President that 
we’ve ever had in the history of America” or “this 
has become Nixon country down through [South 
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Carolina].93 
 This essay argues that part of the reason why 
Graham zealously fostered friendships with those 
in power was so that he could use this platform to 
influence policy decisions and outcomes, a position 
that was useful in a time when his role as a preacher 
offered him less room for political leverage. The 
Preacher himself stated that while he would not use 
his sermons to address political affairs, he would 
take the opportunity to “privately” speak to the 
president if necessary.94 It is noteworthy that Graham 
seemed to have shared a more intimate relationship 
with Johnson and Nixon compared to Eisenhower. 
With the latter, Graham shared that his interactions 
were “warm and friendly, but…mostly formal.”95 As 
Graham turned from political to apolitical in public, 
his private politicking in the form of pursuing close 
friendships with the presidents also seemed to have 
intensified. In navigating between his public and 
private spheres of power, it is likely that Graham 
observed the turbulent, war-weary public atmosphere 
of the 1960s and deemed that the private sphere was 
now more efficacious for voicing his support for the 
war, and hence chose to focus his efforts there.
Hence, it is unsurprising that a study of 
Graham’s private correspondence with the president 
and his aides in the Oval Office reveal a preacher that 
is not only a spiritual mentor and personal friend, 
but also a political advisor. While sources show that 
Graham gave the presidents his opinion on issues 
of domestic and international relevance, this essay 
is mainly interested in his advice regarding issues 
of foreign policy, particularly with regard to the 
Vietnam War. 
 First, there is evidence to indicate that 
Graham met up with the president to discuss issues 
of foreign policy and the war in Vietnam. In a 
letter to Johnson, on November 1966, the Preacher 
requested a visit to the White House after he had 
returned from Vietnam to preach to the troops, in 
order to discuss his “thoughts and impressions” from 
the trip.96 The president’s daily diary records that 
Graham did meet up with the President on January 
18, 1967, precisely to address that topic. Similarly, 
a note in Nixon’s Daily Diary on August 10, 1971 
records how the president and Reverend Graham 
attended a foreign policy briefing by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger, which was arranged by 
the Preacher. The guest list consisted mainly of 
well known evangelical leaders and figures such 
as Bill Bright, the president of Campus Crusade; 
Pat Zondervan, owner of a successful religious 
publishing company; and the chairmen of Gordon 
College and Wheaton College, two established 
Evangelical universities. 
 In these discussions, Graham assured 
Johnson and Nixon that the criticisms regarding their 
decisions to intervene or act decisively in Vietnam 
were invalid. For example, in 1964, he told Johnson 
that the disapproval that he was getting from the 
press on Vietnam was “unjust” and reminded him 
that it was the most criticized men in history who 
would stand out the most.97 Similarly, a conversation 
between Nixon and Graham in February 1973 
showed the two of them criticizing Senator George 
McGovern, Senator Mark Hatfield, and Senator 
Harold Hughes for expressing desire for immediate 
U.S. withdrawal from North Vietnam regardless of 
circumstance. Graham then congratulated Nixon for 
signing the Paris Peace Accords of January 27, 1973, 
and praised his “determination and perseverance” in 
the negotiations and achieving peace in such a way 
that the communists did not have the upper hand. 
Furthermore, by telling the president that “in a very 
dark moment in December [he was] right”, Graham 
seemed to be affirming the U.S. decision to bomb 
Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, which 
Nixon made to show support for South Vietnam and 
force the North back into peace negotiations.98
 Not only did Graham fend off criticisms 
regarding intervention in Vietnam, he also 
encouraged the presidents to fight the war by 
emphasizing the importance of their leadership, 
depicting them to be savior-like figures amidst the 
chaos. By labeling the communists in Vietnam as evil 
and expansionary, Graham encouraged President 
Johnson to see himself as “the man that helped saved 
Christian civilization.”99 In the same vein, Graham 
purportedly told Nixon that amidst degeneration 
and chaos in the world, the American people would 
look to him for leadership.100 After Nixon signed 
the Peace Treaty in January 1973, Graham assured 
the president that there was a “whole new respect for 
[him] on the campuses,” and he had a “groundswell 
of support” from the people who now saw that Nixon 
was right in bombing Vietnam in December.101 
 Furthermore, there is evidence that Graham 
even tried to offer specific advice on military strategy 
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to the White House. In the Nixon Presidential 
Library Archives, there is a document labeled 
“Vietnam Strategy” and signed “BG, January 3, 1969.” 
At the top right hand corner of the first page, there is 
a handwritten note which reads “File: Billy Graham, 
January 5, 1969,” confirming that the evangelist wrote 
the report. While it is unclear whether President 
Nixon actually carefully read or considered the 
document, it is apparent that the Graham did 
attempt to offer his input on how to act in the war. 
In this private transcript by Graham on the war, 
he emphasized the need to make use of the South 
Vietnamese in fighting the war against the Vietcong. 
By doing this, he asserted that the U.S. could 
strengthen the war effort since the South Vietnamese 
would be able to defeat the enemy with “either ethical 
or unethical methods…familiar to the Oriental” 
and hence free the United States of international 
criticism regarding the means by which the war [was] 
fought.102 There is evidence to show that Nixon did 
consider this particular point in Graham’s proposed 
“Vietnam Strategy”. In a memorandum written to 
Kissinger on August 6, 1971, he wrote,
Billy Graham told me of the fine work that 
____ was doing with some of the tribes in Laos, 
Cambodia and the northern part of South 
Vietnam. Run a check on him and give me a 
report as to how effective he is. Graham tells 
me that his missionary friends say that these 
tribes, of which our own Laotian irregulars are a 
part, are our main bulwark against Communist 
influence in that part of the world.103
Graham’s document also discouraged a U.S. 
withdrawal from Vietnam and urged against 
recognition of the communist Vietcong as a 
legitimate government. He also proposed “the calling 
of China’s bluff ” and warned the Chinese privately 
that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons on them if 
they intervened in Vietnam. Overall, he urged the 
need for “a tough non-nonsense policy” noting that 
the prolonged war had already cost the United States 
its standing and prestige in Asia. He argued that a 
hardline policy would have a psychological impact 
on the communists and push them to the negotiating 
table.104 
Finally, Graham also tried to fight the Vietnam 
War privately on the home front by working behind 
the scenes to influence Evangelical groups to support 
the Vietnam War effort. He told President Nixon 
in a conversation, “Just as you have changed the 
political picture, we hope to change the religious 
picture.”105 He informed Nixon of the formation 
of a pro-war Evangelical alternative to the World 
Council of Churches, a body of mainline Protestants 
groups that fervently opposed the Vietnam War. 
The Preacher condemned the Council for “say[ing] 
nothing against the Communists, ever” and even 
went so far as to comment that “their stuff seems to 
be written on that side of the world [in Moscow].”106 
Graham then informed the president of his plan to 
win over different Protestant groups to his side. In 
response, Nixon told Graham about how Jesuit priest 
John McLaughlin had also become a “convert to our 
side,” coming in as an “all-out peacenik” but then 
returned from a visit to Vietnam with a different 
perspective.107
Graham may have had an apolitical public 
image, but in private, he was actively pursuing a form 
of friendship politics, in which he leveraged upon 
relationships which he had built with those in power 
and used these connections to assert influence on 
U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. The striking similarity 
in Graham’s interactions with both Johnson and 
Nixon suggest that Graham was an adept political 
actor who rose above partisan lines and was able 
to win the friendship of both a Democrat and a 
Republican. With both presidents, he formed a 
relationship, offered prayers and God’s favor, and 
promoted a tough stance in Vietnam. 
 Yet, Graham was not merely an individual 
dabbling in politics, but was a representative of 
a greater Evangelical movement that supported 
war against the communists. The Billy Graham 
Evangelistic Association (BGEA) was formed in 1950 
with the purpose of organizing Graham’s outreach 
efforts, which had started to increase in capacity and 
audience over time. By the seventies, the BGEA grew 
into a megacomplex worth 40 million dollars. It came 
to consist of a myriad of ancillary agencies, ranging 
from a radio station, two in-house magazines, a film 
production company, and a publishing house. It 
received an average of 2.5 million letters per year and 
sent out an average of 100 million.108 The BGEA also 
had its own public relations, financial operations, and 
press release office, which often assisted Graham with 
communication with the White House, scheduling 
the Preacher’s meeting times with the president. 
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Sources also reveal that various members and offices 
of the BGEA communicated with several politicians 
on matters concerning Vietnam. For example, 
Sherwood Wirt, the editor of the BGEA’s Decision 
Magazine sent two congressmen and a senator copies 
of his correspondence with a Canadian subscriber 
regarding the morality of the Vietnam War. In 
the letters, the editor firmly defended the justice 
of the war in light of the evil of communism and 
rejected the subscriber’s arguments for peace.109 
The purpose behind sending these politicians the 
letters could be to privately assure them that Graham 
and the Evangelical movement were supportive of 
the government’s decision to intervene in Vietnam. 
All three politicians thanked Wirt for making the 
correspondence available for their consideration 
and affirmed that they shared identical views on the 
necessity of the war.110 
Evangelicals also tried to use Graham as a 
channel for influence on the president. A group 
of ministers from Los Angeles, for example, sent 
Graham a song entitled “The Prayer of our Nation” 
and asked him to forward it to the president. They 
wrote, “Because you and he are close friends…
perhaps you will feel led out of God…to directly 
contact Mr. Nixon concerning this matter.”111 
Graham also wrote a letter to Nixon telling him 
that he had been inundated with letters, calls, 
and telegrams with ideas and feedback that they 
desired the Preacher to tell the president given 
their known relationship. The president apparently 
took this somewhat seriously and would often pass 
on these letters to his aides and counsels for their 
consideration.112
In particular, Evangelical missionaries in 
Vietnam used Graham as a channel by which they 
could share their opinions on the war with the 
president. This is evidenced from two separate 
missionary reports on Vietnam that Graham 
submitted to Henry Kissinger for his examination. 
In both cases, Graham paraphrased the missionary’s 
reports instead of presenting them verbatim. This 
is likely because Nixon and Kissinger would have 
been less inclined to pay attention to the report 
had it been presented word for word. This indicates 
the importance of Graham as a bridge to the 
politicians in power, and Graham’s ability to use his 
personal connections to gain Evangelicals access 
into the White House. In the first report, labeled 
“Confidential Missionary Plan for Ending the 
Vietnam War” and dated April 15, 1969, Graham 
reported that the missionaries strongly discouraged 
forming a coalition government between North and 
South, for fear that the communists would eventually 
take control. Graham elevated the credibility of 
the report by portraying these missionaries as the 
hands and feet of the U.S. government in Vietnam, 
highlighting their ability to give a unique perspective 
on the situation and sentiment in South Vietnam 
because of their personal ties to the locals and their 
leaders. The report also gave tangible suggestions 
on how to “Vietnamize” the war. This included 
psychological warfare strategies such as propaganda 
television programs as well as specific military 
strategies such as affirming the use of guerilla 
warfare and overwhelming air power. They strongly 
pushed for an offensive in the North rather than 
containment in the South, and even went to the 
extent of suggesting that the U.S. could specifically 
afford to withdraw 100,000 troops by the end of the 
year.113 Two years later, in 1971, Graham submitted 
another missionary report that evaluated the success 
of the Vietnamization strategy. The missionaries 
warned that an immediate U.S. withdrawal would 
be a ‘disaster’ because the South Vietnamese were 
not motivated or ready to fight for themselves. They 
also argued that the Montagnard tribal highlanders 
were essential for the success of the Vietnamization 
program. They concluded by affirming that they were 
prepared to assist the Executive Office in liaising with 
the locals to help the American war effort.114 These 
missionaries were in part motivated by their fear 
of a communist takeover and in part motivated by 
their personal love for and commitment towards the 
locals. Upon reading the report, Kissinger thanked 
Graham for the “first hand knowledge… [which he] 
found quite useful.”115 
The apparent involvement of the missionaries, 
the BGEA and other church leaders demonstrate 
that Graham was not alone in trying to encourage 
the president to continue intervention in Vietnam 
against the communists. Instead, Graham often had 
the partnership and assistance of other Evangelical 
voices. The Preacher then leveraged upon his 
friendship with politicians in power to further the 
Evangelical pro-war agenda, and effectively served 
as a bridge between the movement and the White 
House. 
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WITHIN BLURRED LINES: A NEGOTIATION OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PLATFORMS OF POWER 
So far, this essay has demonstrated a noticeable 
distinction between Graham’s apolitical image in the 
public and his political actions in the private. Yet, 
the line between these two spheres was not always 
as clearly separated or defined in reality. Graham’s 
well-known relationship with presidents often made 
it difficult for him to maintain an apolitical public 
image. Moreover, his involvement in apparently 
political events, such as a Christmas visit to U.S. 
troops in Vietnam in 1966, as well as President 
Nixon’s visit to Graham’s evangelistic crusade in 
Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1970, naturally raised 
doubts on his supposed neutrality. In other words, 
Graham’s political style often created tensions for his 
Evangelical mission. However, Graham never once 
succumbed to admitting a private political agenda, 
but instead, shrewdly navigated past criticisms by 
employing different strategies that would preserve his 
non-partisan public image. 
 First, Graham was careful to portray 
his relationship with the presidents as merely a 
friendship and nothing more. When questioned 
about his role in the Oval Office, he denied any 
influence or any desire to have influence in politics 
and claimed that he was not a regular at the White 
House. Even when he admitted to meeting with the 
presidents, he argued that the bond he shared with 
these men was “not political or intellectual [but] 
personal and spiritual.”116 On the few occasions that 
Graham acknowledged an advisory role in the White 
House, he would admit only to being a spiritual 
mentor. He openly stated in a television interview 
that the president’s position of leadership was a 
solitary one and Graham was happy to provide him 
with all the prayers necessary.117 However, while 
he acknowledged the spiritual dimensions of his 
relationship with the presidents, Graham’s preferred 
public representation of his relationship with the 
president still remained that of friendship.  
 For critics unconvinced that Graham held a 
purely apolitical friendship with the White House, 
Graham would allow a slightly more satisfactory 
answer. He admitted that at times, he would discuss 
political issues with the presidents, but only as a 
friend and confidante, and as such, the content of 
these conversations should remain confidential. 
Through this strategy of remaining silent, Graham 
was able to somewhat appease his detractors without 
stirring up any unnecessary controversy or negative 
publicity. In an open statement in 1973 defining 
his position on the Vietnam War, Graham stressed 
that “any discussion [he had] with a President [was] 
private.”118 In a separate interview, Graham made a 
similarly styled statement, “It is an unwritten law that 
when you visit a head of state, you do not reveal what 
you discussed.”119 In his autobiography, the Preacher 
claimed that when he discussed politics with Nixon, 
it was always in an informal and unofficial capacity. 
He admitted that Nixon saw him as a “trusted 
friend without a personal agenda” who could act 
as a “sounding board” for his ideas, and listened to 
his private thoughts without leaking them to the 
public.120 
It is in concrete events that we are best able to 
witness the tensions that Graham faced in trying to 
maintain an apolitical public image while still making 
political maneuvers in the private. The line between 
public and private, apolitical and political became 
blurred in these events: Graham was asked by the 
president to participate in public events that could 
easily be construed as political in nature. Agreeing to 
get involved would potentially tarnish the apolitical 
public representation he had nurtured; on the other 
hand, rejecting the president’s request might mean 
losing political influence in the private. Therefore, 
Graham was often made to negotiate between private 
demands and public implications. Most of the 
time, the Preacher weighed the former to be more 
important and thus had to find a way to maneuver 
past criticisms and maintain his appearance of 
neutrality. 
In December 1966, Billy Graham took an 
eight-day public Christmas visit to Vietnam at the 
request of President Johnson. Here, we witness the 
Preacher’s observed apolitical-political style played 
out in a particular event. When questioned by the 
media, Graham claimed that General William C. 
Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in 
Vietnam, was the man who had invited him to speak 
in Vietnam.121 The stated purpose of the trip was 
to preach the gospel to the military and the locals, 
as well as to encourage missionaries and chaplains 
in Vietnam. He clearly stated that he was “not 
going to get involved in politics” but only wanted 
to “preach a Christian message.”122 However, in 
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private, sources show that Graham’s visit was in fact 
a political maneuver, requested by President Johnson 
himself. Following the Preacher’s return, the BGEA 
created and circulated a television program titled 
“Billy Graham on Vietnam.” The program discussed 
his trip to Saigon and aimed to shed light on the 
‘spiritual impact’ of the war on the American troops 
and the Vietnamese. While its content and subject 
was seemingly apolitical in focus, the purpose of 
the program was clearly political. This is strongly 
indicated by how the BGEA sent a tape and transcript 
of the program to the White House as well as a letter 
that wrote,
It is our intention to place this program on as 
many television stations as possible. We feel 
it contains the type of information people 
should know and we are particularly delighted, 
concerning Dr Graham’s remarks about the 
President.... If I can be of any help to...the 
President, concerning this tape, please do not 
hesitate to let me know at once. Also, I would 
appreciate hearing the reaction of the President 
after his viewing of this tape.123
However, because of the nature of the event, 
it was difficult for Graham to mask his private 
political agenda and sustain an apolitical front. 
Given the fierce public debate on the American 
home front regarding the justice of the Vietnam 
War, his publicized visit to Vietnam received a fair 
share of criticism and raised doubts on his neutrality. 
In January 1967, an editorial in The Christian 
Century, a liberal-leaning anti-war Christian 
magazine, condemned Graham for endorsing the 
war, condoning its violence, and “meddling with 
national policy…[through] leap[ing] with both 
feet into the political arena.”124 Another editorial 
criticized Graham for his “duplicity” and demanded 
that he “drop the image of holy transcendence.”125 
Moreover, in deciding to visit Vietnam, Graham had 
to answer several reporters’ eager questions regarding 
his opinion on the justice and morality of American 
intervention in Vietnam.
Yet, in negotiating the benefits of accepting 
the president’ request (that is, maintaining his 
friendship and influence at the White House) and 
its potential cost on his public image, Graham 
was willing to risk the latter. After all, by firmly 
and squarely maintaining his neutrality instead of 
publicly revealing his pro-war stance, the Preacher 
could still avert media spotlight and overly harsh 
criticisms. When asked to comment on the justice of 
the war, Graham deferred his remarks to the end of 
his Vietnam tour. When questioned again after his 
trip, he still declined an answer by saying that the 
situation was “very confusing and frustrating” and 
“outside [his] jurisdiction.”126 He proposed that he 
was neither a hawk nor a dove, but instead likened 
himself to an ambiguous biblical symbol of a lamb 
ready for sacrifice.127 
Graham also carefully crafted his apolitical 
image by ensuring that none of his actual activities 
during the Vietnam visit could be construed or 
reported as remotely political by his critics. He 
did exactly what he said he would do – preach the 
gospel. Reports of Graham’s visit showed him touring 
hospitals, missionaries, and churches, and singing 
Christmas carols with the American troops while 
telling the Christmas story. One newspaper report 
painted for readers a beautiful image of his Christmas 
Eve prayer meeting at the base camp of the U.S. 1st 
Calvary airmobile division in An Khe, where 10,000 
candles were lit as searchlights were temporarily 
turned off.128 Another report told the touching story 
of Graham holding the hand of a badly wounded 
soldier and praying over him as doctors treated the 
man’s bleeding arm.129 
Overall, his publicly apolitical strategy seemed 
to be effective in staving off criticism, particularly 
when compared to the explicit political overtures 
of Cardinal Francis Spellman, another influential 
figure invited by President Johnson to Vietnam. The 
Cardinal was outspoken in his support for the war, 
asserting that anything short of a complete victory 
for the United States was unacceptable.130 In his 
Christmas sermon to the troops, he likened the U.S. 
forces to “soldiers of Jesus Christ” fighting “a war 
for civilization.”131 Critics immediately denounced 
Spellman; metropolitan dailies across the US carried 
reports of how 75 lay Catholics staged a protest in 
front of the Cardinal’s residence in response to his 
pro-war statements. They also told of an Episcopal 
Bishop from California openly expressing outrage, 
and of several national and international Roman 
Catholic magazines condemning Spellman for going 
against the Pope.132 In comparison, Graham came 
out of his visit to Vietnam relatively unscathed. 
Notably, most of Graham’s criticisms were found 
in Christian magazine editorials, whereas stories 
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of Spellman’s public denouncement were widely 
carried by the mainstream media. Not only does this 
demonstrate the effectiveness of Graham’s “apolitical” 
public strategy, but it also reveals how the Preacher 
was able to successfully negotiate the demands and 
consequences of his actions in the private and public 
sphere.
Moreover, the episode in Vietnam also reveals 
that Graham did not always strictly act politically 
in the private sphere, and apolitically in the public 
sphere. The shrewdness of Graham’s politically 
apolitical strategy lied in the ability for even an 
apolitical image to make a political impact. On first 
glance, Graham’s television program appeared to be 
apolitical in focus. However, a deeper examination 
of its content reveals Graham’s tacit support of U.S. 
intervention and confirms the program’s hidden 
agenda of subtly manipulating its viewers to support 
the war.
First, rather than give a depressing report on 
war, Graham painted a positive and encouraging 
picture. Vietnam has often been known as the first 
“television war,” given that the television allowed 
for daily exposure to violent and horrific images of 
the conflict, intensifying the atmosphere of war-
weariness among the American public.133 Perhaps 
Graham’s television program was created to counter 
the negativity and turn around the anti-war public 
mood. Instead of focusing on gory images of death, 
bombing and maiming in the jungles, the Preacher 
chose to emphasize the “sheer beauty…and wealth of 
the country.” He described the French city of Saigon 
as “lovely” and “beautiful.”134 Instead of reporting 
the alarming death rate of American troops, Graham 
paid tribute to the patriotism and motivation of the 
military men. He compared them to the soldiers in 
the Korean War and praised them for being more 
committed, better equipped and educated, and more 
motivated.135 
Second, Graham implicitly suggested to 
viewers that U.S. intervention was advantageous to 
the Vietnamese people. He argued that Americans 
should be proud of the military men in Vietnam 
because they were not only sent to bring war but also 
peace to the nation. He described how these army 
personnel were “engaged in tremendous pacification” 
as they “[taught] these people how to work out their 
lives.”136 This sentiment corroborates with a later 
statement by Graham in a press conference in 1968 
where he called the public to remember how “there 
[were] millions of little people in Asia that are scared 
to death that [the U.S. was] going to withdraw.”137 
By highlighting the dependency of Asia on America, 
Graham tacitly gave his stamp of approval to the 
American intervention. 
Finally, in order to subtly encourage Evangelical 
viewers to support the war, the program chose to 
highlight the fruitful conditions of Evangelical 
ministry in Vietnam, claiming that it was a 
“misunderstood dimension” of the war. The program 
opened with a story from a U.S. Marine Captain 
stationed in Denang, Vietnam testifying to how 
200 men accepted Christ at the Christmas service 
that Graham had conducted. The Preacher then 
affirmed that the troops were extremely responsive 
to the gospel message, more so than any other 
audience he has had in the world. He also praised 
the military chaplains for conducting strong 
evangelistic follow-up classes and programs. Graham 
also highlighted how the war was opening doors 
for fruitful Evangelical missions to the Vietnamese 
people. He described his meetings with missionaries 
as well as local Vietnamese Christian pastors and 
even went to the extent of declaring that Vietnam 
was en route to becoming the religious leader of 
Southeast Asia.138 It was likely that this seemingly 
apolitical message would result in a political impact, 
particularly on an Evangelical viewer. After all, an 
Evangelical would have probably been significantly 
moved by the conversion stories of army personnel 
and locals in Vietnam and as a result, subconsciously 
start to take on a more supportive stance on the 
war. On a separate occasion, a missionary requested 
Decision Magazine to run an article publicizing the 
Evangelicals’ abundant ministry in Vietnam. While 
he argued that such a move should “in no way be 
political,” he also acknowledged that “it could exert a 
very profound influence on the reading audience of 
the magazine and in turn help to counteract so much 
of what is being said in the press.”139 While this is 
admittedly a different incident, it does suggest that 
Graham, Reverend Haden, and the team at the BGEA 
were likely cognizant and encouraging of the political 
impact that “Billy Graham in Vietnam” would have 
on its Evangelical viewers.
Two years after a second visit to the Vietnam 
troops in 1968, Graham got involved in yet another 
apparently apolitical event, which he once again used 
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for political signaling. On May 28, 1970, Richard 
Nixon appeared at Billy Graham’s evangelistic 
crusade at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, 
and was given an opportunity to address the crowd. 
This marked the first time the BGEA had allowed a 
president to speak at a crusade. Similar to Graham’s 
visit to Vietnam, the Preacher’s political-apolitical 
style of politics is clearly manifested in this event. In 
the lead-up to the event, Graham assured the media 
that “there [would] not be anything political…in his 
visit.”140 Unsurprisingly similar to the Vietnam tour, 
the program at the crusade appeared non-partisan 
and non-political in both style and content. The 
program flowed as per normal: a time of worship and 
song, a choir performance, a sermon by Graham, 
and a final alter call to participants to accept Christ. 
The remarks made by Nixon were short in length 
and neutral in content, centering on praise for the 
Preacher and admiration for America’s “dedicated” 
youth.141
While there is no concrete evidence to prove 
that it was the president who initiated his own 
appearance, understanding the context surrounding 
the event strongly indicates that it was a strategic 
political maneuver. Nearly one month prior to the 
Crusade, news of American invasion of Cambodia 
had led to violent protests all around the nation, 
particularly on college campuses. Demonstrations 
at Kent State University and Jackson State College 
saw a dramatic clash with the police, resulting in the 
shocking death of six students. In response to this 
news, hundreds of university students went on strike, 
and some campuses even had to be closed down to 
avert further violence.142 Hence, Nixon’s attendance 
at the Crusade could be read as an attempt to 
symbolically reclaim support for the president and 
the war among young people. As a New York Times 
article accurately put it, Nixon was anxious to “create 
a new image of communication with youth.”143 
Rather than a naïve party, Graham seemed to be fully 
cognizant of and involved in the plan. He shared in 
an interview that he had invited Nixon to the crusade 
because he identified that “the problem [was] with 
the university students right now” and “this would 
give [Nixon] an opportunity [to be] the president of 
all people.”144
However, as in his visit to Vietnam, the 
president’s appearance at the Knoxville event was 
hard for Graham to defend as purely apolitical. 
Moreover, in a time when antiwar opinion in the 
wake of the invasion of Cambodia was reaching 
new heights, Graham received more criticism for 
his apparent violation of separation between church 
and state. Even if the Preacher had claimed that 
Nixon’s appearance was non-partisan in purpose, a 
politically charged university landscape naturally led 
to a political interpretation of the event. Nearly 320 
protestors showed up at the event, angered by the 
war in Vietnam and frustrated at Nixon’s appearance. 
At the start of the event, a small group of protestors 
marched into the stadium imitating a funeral 
procession, carrying a casket and holding signs and 
banners that read, “Thou shalt not kill” or “God 
giveth life and Nixon taketh away.” Throughout the 
Crusade, they filled up pockets of silence with anti-
war chants like “1,2,3,4 we don’t want Nixon’s fucking 
war.”145 
Never before had Graham had received such 
loud and vehement criticism, but rather than caving 
into admitting a political agenda, the Preacher 
once again attempted to fend off criticism by firmly 
maintaining his apolitical stance. In an interview 
with the New York Times a month after the crusade, 
he was quick to dismiss suggestions that the president 
had made use of the crusade for political purposes. 
Graham portrayed himself as the initiator and Nixon 
as following his lead. He insisted that he was the one 
who had requested Nixon’s attendance and that in 
response, the president was initially uncertain about 
accepting the invitation because he was afraid that it 
would “look political.”146 In portraying Nixon’s reply 
as hesitant and casual, Graham attempted to quell 
claims that the event was carefully planned with a 
political purpose. 
Hence, the Knoxville event is another clear 
example of how Graham sometimes felt a pull 
of tension between meeting a private political 
demand and its potential cost on his public image. 
In negotiating costs and benefits, Graham made a 
gamble and allowed the president to speak at his 
crusade. Since the majority of the crusade audience 
already supported Nixon and the war effort, it 
was unlikely that the Preacher was motivated by a 
desire to rally support for Vietnam.147 Instead, it is 
possible that the Preacher took the risk because he 
was keen on using the event to prove to Nixon that 
the Evangelical population was a solid coalition in 
his “great silent majority”.148 Desiring for greater 
24
columbia university journal of politics & society
Evangelical policy influence, Graham had repeatedly 
tried to convince the president of the importance 
of Evangelicals as an electoral group. For example, 
he wrote a letter to Nixon telling him about an 
“emerging Evangelical strength in the country that 
[was] going to have a strong bearing on social and 
political matters” in the coming years.149 Later on 
in 1972, Graham strongly recommended Nixon 
to include a “spiritual note” in his presidential 
acceptance speech because “many of [his] hard core 
supporters [had] a strong belief in God.”150  The 
Knoxville Crusade itself seemed to prove Graham’s 
point. A majority of the audience had responded 
enthusiastically when the president first entered 
the stadium. The crowd voiced its disapproval of 
protestors’ cries of “Peace, peace” by retorting with 
shouts of “Commie, commie.” A student who was 
passing out anti-war literature shared how many 
crusade participants rejected him, and one even 
went so far as to tell him to “stick it up [his] ass.”151 
President Nixon also seemed to be aware that the 
crowd was in his favor, as revealed by the note he 
made in his speech on how he was “glad that there 
seem[ed] to be a rather solid majority on one side 
rather than the other side tonight,” and this majority 
“[did] not approve of violence.”152
So, we can see that, rather than a flat caricature 
of an individual who solely acted apolitical in the 
public and political in the private, we can see that 
Graham was a three-dimensional political actor who 
shrewdly and appropriately navigated the private 
and public space. Miller argued that Graham was 
an adept politician, one with “seeming authenticity” 
and one who was able to masterfully “avoid specifics 
about more controversial subjects.”153 Both events 
highlighted how the Preacher was able to stave off 
a lot of censure by consistently maintaining his 
apolitical position even in the face of opposition. 
The episode in Vietnam particularly demonstrated 
the artfulness of Graham’s apolitical front, in that a 
seemingly apolitical program could be used to make 
a political impact and subtly garner support for 
the war. On the other hand, the event at Knoxville 
showed how Graham was sometimes willing to risk 
his apolitical image for the sake of a greater cause (in 
this case, convincing Nixon of an Evangelical silent 
majority). In fact, both cases highlight the natural 
tension that Graham felt in associating himself so 
closely with the president. To do so meant putting 
himself at risk of considerable criticism for the 
perceived violation of church and state, and yet, in 
negotiating the costs and benefits of such a move, 
“the disadvantages were far outweighed by the 
opportunity.”154 Moreover, as a Christianity Today 
article wrote, there were “ample biblical precedents” 
found in the stories of Esther, Joseph and Daniel 
that demonstrated that one could do the work of 
God through private relationships with those in 
government.155 All in all, our examination of the 
complexities of real life political events that the 
Preacher had to navigate provides greater depth to 
our vision of Graham as a political actor.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE PREACHER: A TWO-
WAY RELATIONSHIP
A greater degree of nuance can be added 
when we consider things from the perspective of 
those in political power. While it is not this essay’s 
purpose to prove that the presidents actually heeded 
Graham’s advice on the Vietnam War, it should be 
noted that the relationship between the Preacher 
and the Oval Office was a two-way rather than one-
sided one. Although there is evidence indicating 
that Johnson and Nixon had some level of genuine 
admiration and respect for the Preacher, sources also 
reveal how White House aides carefully strategized 
the president’s relationship with the Preacher 
and made use of this relationship to achieve the 
administrations’ own political purposes. 
The dynamic relationship between preacher 
and president is demonstrated by how both Johnson 
and Nixon often took the initiative to write letters, 
make phone calls, and arrange meetings with 
Graham. Rather than only waiting for Graham to 
contact them, the presidents often made time to 
seek the Preacher’s assistance and advice on matters 
related to policy. In a telephone conversation with 
Graham on 16 January 1967, Johnson applauded 
him for his performance in his visit to Vietnam 
and then invited him to the White House to give 
impressions of his experience in Vietnam.156 Two 
days later, the president’s daily diary records that the 
meeting between both men actually materialized, and 
Graham was said to have reported that the morale of 
American troops in Vietnam was very high.157 Yet, 
another record in Johnson’s Daily Diary documents 
how on June 14, 1967, Graham was invited to a 
Cabinet meeting in which he witnessed a briefing 
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on the UN and Middle East Situation as well as the 
problem of refugees in the United States.158 Under 
Nixon’s office, the presidential daily diaries reveal that 
the president would sometimes contact the Preacher 
for his own needs. On one occasion, Nixon called 
Graham three consecutive times without Graham 
picking up, and when Nixon finally got through to 
him, the president ironically complained about how 
difficult it was to get a hold of the Preacher when he 
needed him.159
Rather than a single explanation, it is more 
likely that there were a variety of reasons that 
account for why the presidents were motivated 
to actively pursue a relationship with Graham, 
rather than simply respond or react to the man. For 
one, there is strong evidence to indicate that the 
presidents possessed a significant degree of genuine 
affection and respect for the Preacher. The telephone 
conversations and letters of correspondence between 
these men reveal a tone of friendliness and sincere 
concern. One particular conversation recorded 
Johnson and Graham casually grumbling on the 
perils of aging and exchanging advice on what type of 
pills to take.160 On another occasion, Johnson wrote 
a letter to Graham thanking him for his Christmas 
gift of “pretty cufflinks” and of “popcorn [that would] 
be devoured with much eagerness.”161 In writing to 
Reverend Pollock, Graham’s biographer, Johnson 
sincerely affirmed that he would “never forget what 
it [was] like to have his companionship and his 
compassion, and to be better because of it.”162 
Nixon was known to have an even closer 
relationship with Graham than Johnson. ‘Dick’ 
wrote frequent letters to ‘Billy’ praising him for 
being an inspiration, and blessing and thanking 
him for “incisive and timely observations”. He 
constantly assured him that he was a “great source of 
strength for [him]” and gave him many “affectionate 
regards and warm wishes.”163 Moreover, it seems 
like the president took a genuine interest in 
Graham’s opinion on political matters. In a White 
House memorandum, an aide reminded Harry R. 
Haldeman, Nixon’s chief of staff, that in addition to 
men like Nelson Rockefeller, Ronald Reagan, and 
John Connally, the president had also instructed 
him to contact Billy Graham on a weekly basis to 
update him on political situations and receive his 
opinions on these matters.164 The series of “talking 
points briefing papers” which the aides prepared 
for Haldeman saw him asking the Preacher for his 
impressions on how various groups in the country 
were reacting to specific events, such as Kissinger’s 
secret negotiation with North Vietnam or the 
invasion and bombing of Cambodia.165 The Preacher 
was also asked to comment on how he thought 
Nixon would fare in California in the presidential 
election of 1972, as well as give feedback on how the 
president could strengthen his position and maintain 
local support.166 While there is nothing to prove 
that Nixon actually listened to Graham’s advice, 
the fact that he instructed his aides to meet with 
Graham weekly indicate that the president saw the 
Preacher’s viewpoints as respectable and worthy of 
consideration.
Subsequent personal oral history interviews 
with the presidents’ assistants and friends confirm 
that Nixon and Johnson had some degree of genuine 
liking and respect for the Preacher. Arthur Krim, 
advisor to Johnson, admitted that the president was 
“obviously a fan of Billy’s” even if he was not a “fan 
of evangelism.” He revealed that Graham was often 
invited to visit Johnson’s ranch in Texas and the two 
“seemed [to] like each other.”167 Such a sentiment can 
be corroborated by Lady Bird’s interview in which 
she shared that Graham was a necessary feature 
of the Johnsons’ lives and Bird was grateful for the 
friendship that she and President Johnson shared 
with Billy Graham and his wife.168 In the case of 
Nixon, his assistant Charles Colson acknowledged 
that Nixon saw Graham as a “guy to talk over ideas 
and ask for opinions and reactions” and admitted 
that the president would “sound him out on 
things.” Moreover, Nixon and Johnson’s letters of 
correspondence with Graham did not stop after these 
men stepped down from their office in the White 
House, but continued on for many years in frequency 
and intimacy, indicating that the presidents saw their 
friendship with Graham as more than just functional. 
Yet, as demonstrated by Graham’s ‘friendship 
politics,’ one observes that in reality, genuine 
friendships can coexist with hidden political agendas. 
Just because the presidents earnestly admired 
Graham and enjoyed his company does not negate 
the fact that they also saw the expediency of publicly 
associating themselves with him. Rather than 
allowing a purely organic relationship to form, the 
presidents carefully nurtured their relationship with 
Graham. This is strongly suggested by the entourage 
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of White House aides that strategized and fashioned 
the president’s public relationship with the Preacher. 
Soon after Johnson became president, his assistant 
Bill Moyers rejected an appeal from a minister who 
had requested that he utilize his personal friendship 
with Graham to encourage him to hold a crusade 
in Texas, a location that the minister felt was of 
crucial political importance.169 Moyers was hesitant 
to approach Graham because the ‘president and 
[himself had] gotten fairly close to Billy in the last 3 
months … [and they] try to avoid anything that even 
appears to be using this relationship for a purpose 
other than the friendship and fellowship it brings.”170 
The sense of caution in Moyer’s reply suggests a sense 
of strategy in the way in which Johnson groomed his 
relationship with Graham. Charles Colson, special 
counsel to President Nixon, admitted in an oral 
history interview that they “tried in many ways to 
use Billy Graham [and they were] in the business 
of manipulating religious leaders.” They attempted 
to make use of his mailing lists and also used him 
to assemble Evangelical leaders for a meeting in 
the White House so that they could “give them 
a real snow job.”171 Some of the president’s aides 
evidently did not share the President’s affection for 
the Preacher, and sometimes even went to the extent 
of mocking Graham. Haldeman once left a memo for 
Ehrlichman that wrote:
Billy Graham raised with the President today the 
point that postal rates for religious publications 
are being increased 400% while postal rates for 
pornography are only being increased 25%. 
Needless to say, the President was horrified to 
learn of this state of affairs and wants to know 
what we are doing about it.172 
Upon cultivating a friendship with the Preacher, 
the presidents attempted to exploit the relationship 
for various political ends. By 1973, Graham had 
become a world-famous evangelist who had 
reached more than 5 million people in 38 different 
countries.173 In the Gallup poll’s list of “Top 10 Most 
Admired Men in the World”, Graham has finished 
in the top ten 48 times since 1955, more than any 
other man since the poll started in 1948.174 Time 
Magazine even dubbed him the “Pope of Protestant 
America” between 1950-1990.175 The White House 
was aware of Graham’s widespread popularity and 
frequently attempted to make use of its friendship 
with Graham to shore up political support for 
the president among the Preacher’s adherents. A 
memo from State Senator John Colan to Richard 
Nixon, dated July 2, 1968, was labeled “Project Billy 
Graham” and had the stated of goal “utiliz[ing] 
and develop[ing] in the most positive manner an 
endorsement of Richard Nixon by Billy Graham, the 
Christian Statesman.”176 The plan was to use Nixon’s 
friendship with Graham to garner votes for Nixon 
in the upcoming presidential election. “Project Billy 
Graham” was detailed, well thought through, and 
was conceived in four main stages. First, Graham 
would give the invocation at the Republican National 
Convention. Then, Nixon would then appear at 
Graham’s Pittsburgh Crusade and make a publicized 
house visit to Graham in North Carolina. Third, 
Decision Magazine was to cover a personal interview 
with Nixon, specifically in September 1968. Finally, 
Graham was to write a personal letter to everyone on 
his mailing lists requesting them to vote for Nixon 
if “God so leads.”177 Johnson also tried to make 
use of his friendship with Graham to gain political 
support, albeit in a less formal way. He would often 
ask Graham to accompany him to various events 
as a sign of symbolic support. For example, at the 
Convention of American Association of School 
Administrators, Johnson publicly remarked to the 
audience that he “brought Dr. Billy Graham along 
with [him] to do the praying.”178
Moreover, the fact that every president since 
Eisenhower was known to have met up with Graham 
set a precedent for future presidents to desire to 
cultivate some form of public relationship with the 
Preacher. The Preacher himself constantly declared 
in his White House sermons that the presidents were 
given a “mandate higher than the ballot box.”179 In 
the inauguration prayer for Nixon in 1969, Graham 
proclaimed that it was God’s sovereignty that 
“permitted Richard Nixon to lead [America] at this 
momentous hour of history.”180 Hence, in gaining 
the friendship and endorsement of Graham, the 
president could legitimize his office as one that was a 
divine appointment by God. The fashioning of such 
an image was important to the president and his 
aides. In a note to Graham regarding his National 
Prayer Breakfast sermon in January 1973, Nixon’s 
aides requested that the Preacher specifically discuss 
the significance of a leader that was led by God.181 
Particularly with regard to U.S. intervention 
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in Vietnam, the presidents made use of their 
friendship with Graham to both garner support for 
the war among Evangelicals and to counter swelling 
opposition. As described in the previous section, 
Johnson had personally invited Graham to visit 
the troops in Vietnam in December 1966.182 This 
was clearly a political move considering that three 
months earlier, John Wesley White, another BGEA 
evangelist, had put in a request to preach to the 
army men in Vietnam but was rejected. White had 
been told that there was “sufficient chaplain strength 
in Vietnam,” and there was no need for an outside 
evangelist – and yet, three months later, Graham was 
asked by the White House to visit the troops.183 An 
increasingly war-weary public had begun to criticize 
the Johnson administration for prolonging the war. 
Recognizing this, the president mounted a public 
relations propaganda campaign to rally mass support 
for the war. This plan included making arrangements 
for influential American icons to visit Vietnam, as a 
symbolic gesture of support for the president and the 
war effort.184 Hence, Graham’s personal invitation 
to Vietnam was not unique; several other famous 
personalities, such as Cardinal Spellman and Bob 
Hope, had also been given the invite. After their visit, 
it was not the president but his aides that were tasked 
with writing “thank you” telegrams to those men, 
although these were signed off under Johnson’s name. 
Charles Maguire, an assistant to Johnson, wrote 
a tongue-in-cheek comment to Jim Jones saying, 
“Per your unchristian new year’s commands, here 
follows a host of ecumenical presidential telegrams.” 
President Nixon’s aides were also known to have done 
backroom strategizing on how to utilize Graham to 
garner support for the president’s Vietnam policies. 
In brainstorming ideas for Nixon’s Inauguration Day 
program in 1968, a White House aide proposed that 
Nixon visit wounded servicemen in the company 
of Billy Graham so that families of men in Vietnam 
would not feel neglected by the president.185 
Yet, the presidents were not necessarily always 
sly about exploiting Graham and his popularity. 
Graham’s noticeable influence on the world stage 
among people and politicians alike caused the Nixon 
administration to see the value in openly engaging 
him as a goodwill ambassador that could further the 
cause of American diplomacy. After all, the Preacher 
had long promoted to the presidents that he was 
willing to make use of his international crusades to 
‘build a little goodwill for America.’186 Graham also 
notably enjoyed easy access to government leaders 
around the world. When he flew around the world on 
his crusades, he would also often be invited to meet 
up with the ambassadors, admirals, generals, and 
heads of states of these countries. In September 1969, 
Graham informed the White House that Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir had invited him to a private 
chat during her visit to Los Angeles. Henry Kissinger 
immediately instructed him to discuss the reaction of 
the American people to the Middle East situation and 
advised her on the “impossibility of [Nixon] standing 
by and watching the Middle East slip towards almost 
certain war without trying to help provide a political 
alternative.”187 In November 1971, Kissinger wrote 
to Haldeman revealing that Billy Graham had 
been asked by Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the 
Generalissimo to go to Taipei to talk to them about 
a situation in China. The couple affirmed that “Billy 
Graham [was] the one person from [America] that 
they [would] listen to and would like to meet.”188 
Hence, Nixon instructed Kissinger to give Graham a 
thorough briefing on U.S.-China policy and prepare 
talking points that he might use in his discussion 
with the Taiwanese president.189
The relationship shared by Graham and the 
presidents was a multi-layered and dynamic one. The 
White House saw the benefit of a public friendship 
with the Preacher in shoring up domestic political 
support for the president. It also took advantage 
of Graham’s international prestige to secure the 
goodwill of foreign leaders. Hence, more often than 
not, interaction took place not just between two 
individuals, Preacher and president, but rather two 
institutions, Evangelicalism and the White House. 
Similar to how the Preacher had a whole organization 
and movement supporting him in his endeavors, the 
president had the backing and advice of the White 
House aides, counsels, and special assistants. 
CONCLUSION
Over the course of that weekend, Reverend 
Graham planted a mustard seed in my soul, 
a seed that grew over the next year…It was 
the beginning of a new walk where I would 
recommit my heart to Jesus Christ” – George 
W. Bush, 1999 190
On September 14, 2001, three days after the 
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terrorists’ attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon, a National Day of Prayer was called for 
the victims of the attacks. In this time of grief and 
mourning, President George W. Bush gave words 
of comfort from scripture, assuring the nation that 
“neither death nor life nor angels nor principalities, 
nor powers nor things present nor things to come 
nor height nor depth [could] separate [America] 
from God’s love.”191 America then went on to fulfill 
her God-mandated war on terrorism by invading 
Afghanistan and later Iraq. President Bush proudly 
defended that “the Liberty we prize [was] not 
America’s gift to the world, [but was] God’s gift to 
humanity.”192 Supporting this crusade of justice 
against Islamic terrorism, Reverend Ogilvie, chaplain 
of the U.S. Senate, prayed for the “consistency and 
constancy of God’s presence to help [America] battle 
the forces of evil manifested in…cowardly acts of 
terrorism.”193
President Bush’s term in the White House 
seemed to mark the dawning of a new era where 
religion and politics seemed to consort confidently 
and unabashedly. Journalists and scholars alike 
were quick to pick up on this phenomenon. Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr. commented that Bush was the “most 
aggressively religious president Americans have ever 
had” and that “the religious right [had] become a 
potent force in national politics.”194 An article in 
the New York Times declared that Bush’s “faith-
based” approach to his presidential office blurred 
the line between religion and politics more so 
than ever before.195 However, this essay takes the 
view that Bush’s religiosity was not a radical break 
from American diplomatic tradition. One look 
into America’s geopolitical history reveals quite the 
opposite; one only needs to replace “terrorists” with 
“communists” and “Global War on Terror” with 
“Cold War”. The enemy may have changed, but God 
had always been on America’s side, at least in the 
eyes of the Evangelicals and in the rhetoric of the 
politicians with whom they partnered.
While popular portraits of Graham in recent 
times may have depoliticized the man and turned 
him into a transcendent icon, the Preacher was very 
much a political actor in the heyday of his ministry 
in the fifties, sixties, and seventies. There was more 
to the man than met the eye, and he was one who 
shrewdly navigated and negotiated public and private 
spheres of power in order to steer the United States 
in what he deemed to be the right course. Unlike 
the overt and brusque style of the later Evangelical 
leaders, Graham’s particular brand of politics 
moving into the sixties was masterfully subtle. His 
strategy was that of ‘friendship politics’ whereby he 
cultivated a level of intimacy with Johnson and Nixon 
unmatched by any other religious leader at that time, 
and often leveraged upon this connection to gently 
nudge policymakers towards the Calvary.  
Moreover, Graham’s foray into friendship 
politics did not simply remain in his partnership 
with Presidents who professed Christianity; he even 
went to the extent of pursuing a friendship with 
John F. Kennedy, America’s first Catholic president. 
Rather than completely disregard Kennedy solely on 
the basis of his Catholicism, Graham was a flexible 
political actor who was willing and swift to adapt 
to a new circumstance in order to gain access to 
Presidential power. Given the strained start to their 
relationship, Graham could have easily closed off 
all channels of communication with Kennedy once 
he came into office. Yet, in recognizing the need to 
sustain a relationship with the White House in order 
to maintain his political influence, the Preacher 
persisted in pursuing a friendship with Kennedy. He 
was quick to make public amends to his relationship 
with Kennedy. Shortly after the presidential election, 
Graham met up with Kennedy for lunch and a 
round of golf at Palm Beach. At a press conference 
that night, rather than continuing to warn against 
a Catholic president as he did before the election, 
Graham now praised Kennedy for easing Evangelical 
fears about having a Catholic in the White House.196 
Graham’s methods of interaction with Kennedy 
were also reminiscent of the same style of ‘friendship 
politics’ observed with Nixon and Johnson, albeit 
less intimate. When Kennedy’s father suffered a 
massive stroke on December 20, 1961, Graham 
immediately sent a telegram consoling the president 
and assuring him of God’s guidance in this time.197 
He also requested on several occasions to meet 
the president at the White House.198 Graham even 
invited Kennedy to attend his crusade in Chicago 
in June 1962, a generous and conciliatory gesture in 
light of how hesitant Graham and the Evangelical 
community had been of Kennedy in the 1960 
election.199 There is no evidence to show that 
Graham gave his opinion on Vietnam to Kennedy. 
However, this could be explained in part by the fact 
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that there was little public knowledge or concern on 
the escalating war in Vietnam.200
 Graham’s relationship with Kennedy 
serves both as a qualifier and confirmation of this 
essay’s arguments. On one hand, it adds nuance by 
suggesting that religion is likely more influential in 
the White House if the president shares the same 
faith. On the other hand, it also confirms the case 
for Graham’s “friendship” style of politics. Although 
less intimate, Graham’s method of cultivating a 
relationship with Kennedy was very much similar 
to his approach towards Johnson and Nixon. Given 
that the Preacher was willing and ready to foster 
a friendship with a Catholic president, originally 
an opponent, and one known to be somewhat of a 
womanizer, it indicates that Graham probably also 
did not seek friendship with the latter two Presidents 
purely out of affection, or similarity in faith or 
personality, but rather in all three cases, Graham 
viewed ‘friendship’ as a strategic political move to 
build a power base in the White House. After all, 
following Kennedy’s assassination, and when Johnson 
and Nixon came into office and had trouble ending 
the Vietnam War, Graham was quite ready to put 
the blame for the war on Kennedy when questioned 
in public. In both a press conference in 1968 and 
a television interview in 1972, the President stated 
that it was President Kennedy that first committed to 
Vietnam and defended that Johnson had inherited 
a war that he could not pull out of.201 In a private 
conversation with Nixon in April 1971, Graham 
assured the President that he had a written an 
editorial for the New York Times in which he “put all 
the blame for the whole thing on Kennedy [since] he 
sent the first 16,000 combat people” to Vietnam.202 
All in all, this essay has attempted to tell both 
a religious and political history, and conceptualize 
a world in which faith and politics collide, overlap 
and intersect, and where the line between sacred 
and secular is often blurred. Political historians often 
neglect to take the religious perspective seriously, 
treating it as a sideshow unworthy of scholarly 
attention. On the other end of the spectrum, 
historians of religion have often shied away from 
politics, at most only focusing on how religion 
passively responded to the evolution of larger 
political culture. Through examining the political 
maneuvers of a key religious actor, this essay has 
showed that religion not only reacted to political 
trends but also actively sought to shape them. 
This is not an essay about religion and politics 
in general, but specifically on the interplay of religion 
and matters of foreign policy. Graham’s political 
maneuvers and actions in this particular essay were 
studied in the context of the Vietnam War, and this 
was by no means a coincidence. If the narrative of 
Neo-Evangelicalism in American history is of a 
movement that had been shamed in U.S. public life 
and was now trying to reclaim its prominence in 
society, then the arena of war and diplomacy was 
the perfect space for the religious group to express 
and assert itself. The Evangelical brand of theology 
and eschatology encouraged a pro-war stance, a view 
that sometimes sat well with a nationalistic public 
and a perspective that was convenient for political 
figures who want to rhetorically justify the decision 
to go to war.203 History shows that in the United 
States, one does not only rally around the flag, but 
also around God’s flag. After the end of the Vietnam 
War in 1975, foreign policy temporarily went out 
public consciousness, only to resurface with Reagan’s 
call for America to once again wage a relentless 
struggle against the Communist “evil empire”. He 
declared that it was “better to die in a nuclear war, 
still believing in God, than to live under atheistic 
communism.”204 This appeal to religious rhetoric 
was very much reminiscent to the jeremiads of the 
immediate post-war decade, and also the clarion calls 
of Bush’s war against Islamic terrorism. 
Moreover, by demonstrating the attempts 
of Billy Graham and the Evangelical movement 
to voice support for the Vietnam War, this essay 
has also sought to chart a fresh direction in the 
study of the origins of America’s longest and 
most divisive war, a war which cannot be solely 
explained by conventional balance-of-power or 
realist explanations. It was not the ambition of this 
study to measure if religion had an actual impact or 
consequence on foreign policy decision in Vietnam, 
but perhaps this paper could be a stepping stone for 
future scholars to explore the topic.
Interestingly enough, it was the Reverend Billy 
Graham who was asked to give the sermon at the 
Prayer Service held in the aftermath of September 
11. It may seem as if age had finally caught up with 
the man. Now an octogenarian, his wavy blond hair 
turned into a full crown of white and his deep-set 
blue eyes were now hidden behind prescription 
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glasses for farsightedness. But although the vigor and 
electrifying voice of a once itinerant Preacher was no 
more, Billy Graham spoke with the same measure of 
stature and authority, and with the same conviction 
that “God can be trusted even life is at its darkest.”205 
While he reviled the evil of the terrorist attack, his 
chosen focus was on the nation’s spiritual need for 
renewal. The Preacher seemed an appropriate choice 
for the event, for America had come to see Graham 
as one above the fray of culture wars, partisan 
debates, and the very “beacon of stability and 
graciousness.”206 According to some, “Billy Graham 
has lasted so long because he seems to be true…he’s a 
soft spoken man. In days when everything is so loud 
and biased, he talks to people in a loving way.”207 Yet, 
there has always been more to the man than meets 
the eye. After all, the Preacher who had “planted a 
mustard seed” in the soul of the man who eventually 
led the United States to a God-guided war against 
terrorism had long been sowing seeds in the heart 
of a generation of politicians, carefully watering and 
growing the friendships he had cultivated within the 
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